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Statement by Employer to His Employees Concerning 
Cause of Discharge of Fellow Employee Is Not 
Privileged-Sias v. General Motors Corp. 
Plaintiff, employed for ten years by defendant as a plant guard 
and held in high repute by the community, was summarily dis-
charged for allegedly taking company property. The property in 
question was an automobile generator that plaintiff claimed to be-
lieve was one he had arranged to purchase from the company as 
salvage for use in his own car. Plaintiff removed the generator in 
an open manner, explaining to other employees what he was doing. 
The generator was found in the guard booth where plaintiff had 
left it with another guard while he went to the plant medical 
department for treatment of an injury. On his return to the booth 
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he was confronted by his superiors with the property, informed he 
had violated regulations, and fired. Shortly thereafter, in an at-
tempt to arrest rumors and restore morale, defendant informed 
certain other guards, selected at random, of the reason for plain-
tiff's discharge. Plaintiff brought an action for slander. The trial 
court ruled the communication unprivileged and submitted to the 
jury only the question of truth. A verdict for plaintiff was returned. 
On appeal from an order denying defendant's motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, held, affirmed. Fellow employees do 
not have sufficient interest in the discharge of a co-worker to 
protect by qualified privilege a slanderous communication made to 
them by the employer explaining the cause of the discharge. Sias 
v. General Motors Corp., 372 Mich. 542, 127 N.W.2d 357 (1964).1 
The law of qualified privilege recognizes that protection of 
private interests may justify publication of false and injurious com-
munications about third parties when made in good faith.2 In 
determining whether a privilege should attach, a court weighs the 
injury likely to result to the slandered party against the interests 
to be served by making the communication.3 The general view is 
that a privilege will attach only when a "sufficiently important" 
interest of the recipient or some third party4 is at stake, or when the 
publisher has an interest in the publication and the recipient 
possesses either a common5 or reciprocal interest in, or duty con-
cerning, the publication.6 Thus, for example, if it is the publisher's 
interest of the recipient or some third party4 is at stake or when the 
some corresponding interest in the matter or some duty to perform 
with respect to it.1 The Michigan courts have put the rule as follows: 
"It extends to all communications made bona fide upon any subject-
matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in 
reference to which he has a duty to a person having a corresponding 
interest or duty."8 This rule is endorsed in major treatises on 
1. Hereinafter cited as the principal case. 
2. For an early discussion of the policy questions involved, see Holmes, Privilege, 
Malice, and Intent, 8 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1894). See generally Veeder, The History and 
Theory of the Law of Defamation, 4 CouJM. L. REv. 33 (1904). For strongly contrasting 
views as to the relative importance of the interests involved, see Pound, Interests of 
Personality, 28 HARv. L. REv. 446 (1915), and Green, The Right To Communicate, 35 
N.Y.U.L. REv. 903 (1960). 
3. One view of the things to be taken into account by courts in this balancing of 
interests is presented in Harper, Privileged Defamation, 22 VA. L. REv. 642 (1936). This 
same analysis is presented in 1 HARPER 8: JAMES, TORTS § 5.25, at 437-38 (1956), 
4. R.Es'l'ATEMENT, TORTS § 595 (1938). 
5. Id. § 596. 
6. Id. § 594. 
7. "This interest on the part of the recipient is an absolute prerequisite." Jones, 
Interest and Duty in Relation to Qualified Privilege, 22 MICH. L. REv. 437, 440 n.11 
(1924). 
8. Bostetter v. Kirsch Co., 319 Mich. 547, 556-57, 30 N.W.2d Zl6, 279-80 (1948), 
quoting from Bacon v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 66 Mich. 166, 33 N.W. 181 (1887). 
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defamation.9 A critical uncertainty exists, however, with respect to 
what "corresponding interest or duty" will suffice for the privilege to 
attach. In the principal case the defendant's very real interest in 
morale was not disputed, but the court concluded that the cor-
responding interest of the recipients was not sufficient.10 
While the recipients of the communication in the principal case 
did not need such information in order to perform a duty, a number 
of courts have recognized that employees might well have an interest 
in the cause of discharge of another employee.11 Lord Esher, for 
example, in Hunt v. Great Northern Railway,12 in which a railroad 
company informed all its employees of the reason for plaintiff's dis-
charge, declared he could not "imagine a case in which the reciprocal 
interests could be more clear."13 He pointed out that the employer 
had an interest in communicating to his employees what was ex-
pected of them and that the employees had an interest in knowing 
what the consequences of such misconduct would be.14 In the prin-
cipal case other interests might also have been present. Employees 
may very well have an interest in the honesty of their co-workers, as 
the conduct of each worker may reflect on the department as a 
whole.15 Moreover, employees are likely to have an interest in their 
own morale,16 and an employer's efforts to alleviate anxiety by clari-
fying a highly ambiguous job situation will certainly have an impact 
on the morale of the remaining workers. In addition, even beyond 
their separate interests, employees may be considered to have a com-
mon interest with their employer and other employees in the affairs 
of their department. Both Prosser and Newell indicate that such a 
mutual interest would support the defense of qualified privilege.17 
9. NEWELL, SLANDER. & LmEL § 341 (4th ed. 1924); ODGERS, LIBEL & SLANDER 206 (6th 
ed. 1929). 
IO. The court in the principal case appears to be insisting that the recipient 
possess an independent "interest" in the sense that his own welfare is to some degree 
affected. Compare the Restatement's position, which requires merely that "the 
recipient's knowledge of the defamatory matter will be of service in the lawful pro• 
tection ••• " of the publisher's interest. REsTATEMENT, TORTS § 594(b) (1938). 
11. Denver Public Warehouse Co. v. Holloway, 34 Colo. 432, 83 Pac. 131 (1905); 
Gardner v. Standard Oil Co., 179 Miss. 176, 175 So. 203 (1937); Louisiana Oil Co. v. 
Renno, 173 Miss. 609, 157 So. 705 (1934); Hall v. Rice, 117 Neb. 813, 223 N.W. 4 (1929); 
Ramsdell v. Pennsylvania R.R., 79 N.J.L. 379, 75 Atl. 444 (1910). 
12. [1891] 2 Q.B. 189. 
13. Id. at 191. 
14. Ibid. It should be noted that many courts, contrary to Lord Esher, might be 
unwilling to find a privilege when the communication is made to the entire work 
force. See Ramsdell v. Pennsylvania R.R., 79 N.J.L. 379, 381, 75 Atl. 444, 444-45 (1910), 
where a special point is made of the fact that the recipients were members of plaintiff's 
own department. 
15. See Hall v. Rice, 117 Neb. 813,223 N.W. 4 (1929). 
16. The existence of a morale problem over the incident means the other guards 
were disturbed by their own job situation. The sudden and unexplained departure of 
plaintiff might well have caused them serious concern over their own job security. 
17. PROSSER, TORTS § 110, at 809 (3d ed. 1964). He indicates a privilege exists when 
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The Michigan Supreme Court has twice previously held that 
general employees have no corresponding interest or duty that would 
warrant extension of a qualified privilege to communications made 
by the employer to them about a fellow employee;18 but the principal 
case is distinguishable from these cases, and, in fact, they were not 
even cited. In neither of these earlier cases was there any indication 
of the existence of a morale problem. In both earlier cases the 
communications were made as accusations, and among the recipients 
were other employees who were without any special interest in why 
the plaintiff might be disciplined. Moreover, in both of these earlier 
cases the communications were held privileged with respect to 
certain other employees whose duties involved the hire or discharge 
of others or the investigation of irregularities.19 Rather than indicat-
ing that employer communications to employees about co-workers 
are never privileged, these holdings seem to stand only for the 
proposition that no privilege exists when no interest or duty of 
the recipient can be shown. Holding privileged those communica-
tions made to employees whose duties required they have such 
information might even lend support to a finding of privilege in 
the principal case, for the interests of the employer and employees 
in labor tranquility is just as significant as their mutual interest in 
the successful performance of an employee's duties.20 
The holding in the principal case appears to impose an un-
fortunate limitation upon qualified privilege. The implication is 
that, in the absence of some duty of the recipient for which he 
needs such information, the only interest of the recipient that will 
suffice for a privilege to attach is some specific pecuniary interest, 
unless, of course, the communication has to do with some public 
matter in which all citizens may be presumed to have an interest.21 
If, indeed, this is the inference to be drawn, the view that dollar-
"officers, agents or employees ••. communicate with ••• other employees ••• about 
the affairs of the organization itself •••• " Id.; NEWELL, op. cit. supra note 9, § 432. 
18. Poledna v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 360 Mich. 129, 103 N.W.2d 789 (1960); John-
son v. Gerasimos, 247 Mich. 248, 225 N.W. 636 (1929). 
19. That the employee-recipients needed such information to perform their job 
duties adequately was also the ground upon which a privilege was found in Bacon v. 
Michigan Cent. R.R., 66 Mich. 166, 33 N.W. 181 (1887). 
20. In a much earlier Michigan case it was held that "there is no right to make 
untrue and injurious statements concerning others when they are not made to persons 
having right and power to investigate, and in an honest attempt to invoke such 
investigation .••• " Foster v. Scripps, 39 Mich. 376, 382 (1878). But just nine years later 
in Bacon v. Michigan Cent. R.R., supra note 19, the court found a privilege where no 
duty to investigate was involved. In the later case, the railroad's station agents, the 
recipients of the communication, had no investigatory responsibility. They did, how-
ever, need such information because of their resP.onsibility for hiring local help. If 
the same openness to recognition of interests that characterized the Bacon decision 
had persisted, the court in the principal case might have found a privilege. 
21. The principal case, of course, involves only private interests. 
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value is the ultimate criterion in determining the sufficiency of
a reciprocal interest in a commercial setting has received regretta-
ble support.
Why the court in the principal case ignored the very real interests
involved and the considerable contrary authority is not indicated.
On the facts of the case one may very well feel that the defendant-
employer's conduct was unreasonable and that he should be liable,
but one may well quarrel with the means by which this result was
obtained. In the absence of malice or some other abuse destroying
the privilege,22 imposition of liability in situations like this under-
mines the very protection that the qualified privilege is intended to
provide to parties seeking to further legitimate interests.
22. One possible reason why the court held no privilege attached in the principal
case is that in Michigan, once a defense of qualified privilege attaches, it is quite
difficult for the plaintiff to show sufficient abuse to destroy it. For a discussion of what
is required to overcome the defense, see Lawrence v. Fox, 357 Mich. 134, 97 N.W.2d 719
(1959). For two different, yet less rigorous, approaches, see RE.STATEMENT, TORTS §§
600-05 (1938) and Hallen, Character of Belief Necessary for the Conditional Privilege
in Defamation, 25 ILL. L. Ray. 865 (1931).
